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TRAINING TARGETED IN 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Once again, recommendations are being made for 
improved police training. This time in the area of 
street checks and Ontario’s Collection of Identifying 
Information in Certain Circumstances - Prohibition 
and Duties Regulation Of course, however, street 
checks and police  powers related to investigative 
detention and arrest are important to all police 
officers, whether they  work in Vancouver or 
Ha l i f ax , Whi tehor se  o r Toron to . In h i s 
comprehensive Report on the Independent Street 
Checks Review, The Honourable Michael H. 
Tulloch, a justice of the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
makes several training recommendations. These 
topics include:
• The legal framework under which requests for
information may be made, including the
meaning of articulable cause, reasonable
suspicion and investigative detention;
• How to take proper notes of the reasons for the
interaction;
• Rights of individuals under the  Charter and the
Human Rights Code;
• The initiation of interactions with members of
the public;
• The right of an individual not to provide
information to a police  officer, the limitations on
this right and how to ensure that this right is
respected;
• The right of an individual to discontinue an
interaction with a police officer, the limitations
on this right and how to avoid unlawfully
psychologically detaining an individual; and
• Bias awareness, including recognizing and
avoiding implicit bias, as well as how to avoid
bias and discrimination.
Many of these topics have long been the goal of 
this newsletter. Training  is critical to police efficacy 
and promoting public  trust. As Sir Robert Peel once 
said long ago, “the ability of the police to perform 
their duties is dependent upon public  approval of 
police existence, actions, behaviour and the  ability 
of the police  to secure and maintain public 
respect.“ Training will not only improve  public 
confidence in the police but your confidence if 
performing your duties in difficult and often 
demanding circumstances! Be smart and stay safe!
“Through a number of meetings with both frontline and 
more senior officers, it became apparent to me that 
many police officers are not confident in their knowledge 
and understanding of the lawful authorities granted to 
them or the proper scope of their police powers.”      
The Honourable Michael H. Tulloch
Report of the Independent Street Checks Review at p. 161.
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
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professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
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newsletter.   
Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for 2019
General Investigative Skills @ New West 
Campus: March 18-22
Field Trainers @ New West Campus: March 
20-22
Advanced Tactical Surveillance @ Victoria 
Campus: March 25-29 
Intoximeter Training  @ New West Campus: 
April 1-5 
          
Advanced Tactical Surveillance @ New West 
Campus: April 8-12
Forensic DNA @ New West Campus: April 
15-18
Pistol Instructor @ New West Campus: April 
23-27.
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
A budgeting guide for local government.
Robert L. Bland.
Washington, DC: ICMA Press, 2014.
HJ 9147 B55 2014
Autism spectrum disorders.
edited by  Eric Hollander, Randi Hagerman, &  
Deborah Fein.
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association 
Publishing, 2018.
RC 553 A88 A88 2018
Beyond anger: a guide for men: how to free 
yourself from the grip of anger and get more out 
of life.
Thomas J. Harbin, PhD.
Boston, MA: Da Capo Lifelong 2018.
BF 575 A5 H345 2018
Cannabis in the workplace.
John R. Gilmore.
Toronto, ON: Thomson Reuters, 2018.
HV 5822 C3 G55 2018
Cannabis law.
by Bruce A. MacFarlane, Q.C. , Robert J. Frater, Q.C., 
& Croft Michaelson.
Toronto, ON: Thomson Reuters, 2018.
HV 5822 C3 M33 2018
Driver distraction: a sociotechnical systems 
approach.
Katie  J. Parnell, Neville A. Stanton, & Katherine L. 
Plant.
Boca Raton,FL: Taylor & Francis, 2019.
TL 152.3 P36 2019
Engaging men and boys in violence prevention.
Michael Flood.
New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
HM 1116 F56 2019
Essentials of Canadian aboriginal law.
Kerry Wilkins, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M.
Toronto, ON: Thomson Reuters, 2018.
KE 7709 W55 2018
Grief counseling and grief therapy: a handbook 
for the mental health practitioner.
J. William Worden.
New York, NY: Springer Publishing Company, 2018.
RC 455.4 L67 W67 2018
Handbook o f t ra in ing eva lua t ion and 
measurement methods.
Jack J. Phillips & Patricia Pulliam Phillips.
Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
HF 5549.5 T7 P43 2016
How to lie with charts.
Gerald Everett Jones.
Santa Monica, CA: LaPuerta, 2018.
HF 5718.22 J66 2018
Human re sources gu ide to workp lace 
investigations.
Janice Rubin & Christine M. Thomlinson.
Toronto, ON: Canada Law Book, 2018.
HF 5549.5 E43 R83 2018
Messing with the enemy: surviving in a social 
media world of hackers, terrorists, Russians, and 
fake news.
Clint Watts.
New York, NY: Harper, 2018.
HM 742 W399 2018
The jury under fire: myth, controversy, and 
reform.
Brian H. Bornstein & Edie Greene.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017.
KF 8972 B67 2017
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
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SERVICES
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CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
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www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
Volume 19 Issue 1 ~ January/February 2019
PAGE 5
TRANSMISSION DATA 
RECORDER ASSISTANCE ORDER 
AUTHORIZED SUBSCRIBER INFO
Re: Section 487.02 of the Criminal Code, 
2019 NLCA 6 
A police officer involved in a serious 
d rug i nve s t i ga t i on swore an 
Information to Obtain (ITO) a 
Transmission Data Recorder (TDR) 
warrant under s. 492.2(1) of the 
Criminal Code. A TDR warrant authorizes the 
police to obtain transmission data when there is a 
reasonable suspicion, that “an offence has been or 
will be committed [ … ] and that transmission data 
will assist in the investigation of the offence”. A 
TDR captures the transmission data in “real time” 
so that suspected crime can be investigated as it is 
being committed or soon thereafter. In this case, the 
police were seeking information respecting 
unknown telephone communications with an 
identified mobile phone number. Since a TDR 
warrant would only capture the numerical digits of 
the as yet unknown telephone numbers which were 
communicating with the identified mobile phone 
number and not the  names and addresses 
(subscriber information) associated with the 
unknown telephone numbers, the officer also 
swore an ITO to obtain an assistance order under s. 
4 8 7 . 0 2 . Th e a s s i s t a n c e o r d e r r e q u i r e d 
telecommunications service providers (TSPs) to give 
the police the subscriber information associated 
wi th the t e lephone number s tha t were 
communicating with the identified mobile phone 
once those telephone numbers were captured.
Newfoundland & Labrador Provincial Court 
Although the judge granted the TDR 
warrant, he refused to grant the 
a s s i s t a n c e o r d e r b e c a u s e h e 
concluded that he did not have 
jurisdiction to do so. In his view, it was outside the 
scope of s. 487.02 where the purpose of the 
assistance order was to require a  TSP to provide 
subscriber information associated with the raw 
telephone numbers disclosed through the TDR.  
Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court
The Crown applied for certiorari to 
quash the  provincial court judge’s 
decision and mandamus to compel him 
(or another judge) to reconsider the 
application on a proper jurisdictional basis. The 
Supreme Court judge, however, denied the Crown’s 
application. “The powers to police granted under 
s. 492.2 of the Code are limited to obtaining that 
which falls within the definition of ‘transmission 
data’,”  said the  Supreme Court judge. “Subscriber 
information is not transmission data.”  He refused 
to expand the interpretation of the definition 
“transmission data” to allow the police  access to 
subscriber information through the use of an 
assistance order.  In his view, any assistance order 
could only be used for the purpose of assisting in 
fulfilling the objective of obtaining transmission 
data as defined under s. 492.2, and not for the 
purpose of obtaining subscriber information. The 
Crown’s application for certiorari and mandamus 
was dismissed.
BY THE BOOK:
s. 492.2 Criminal Code
Warrant for transmission data recorder
s. 492.2 (1) A justice or judge who is satisfied by 
information on oath that there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offence has been or 
will be committed against this or any other Act 
of Parliament and that transmission data will assist in the 
investigation of the offence may issue a warrant authorizing a 
peace officer or a public officer to obtain the transmission 
data by means of a transmission data recorder.
Scope of warrant
(2) The warrant authorizes the peace officer or public officer, 
or a person acting under their direction, to install, activate, 
use, maintain, monitor and remove the transmission data 
recorder, including covertly.
Limitation
(3)  No warrant shall be issued under this section for the 
purpose of obtaining tracking data. [...]
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Newfoundland & Labrador Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the 
Supreme Court judge erred in 
finding the assistance order 
sought in this case was not 
reasonably required to give effect to the issued TDR 
warrant. In the Crown’s opinion, an assistance 
order was available to require TSPs to provide the 
subscriber information associated with particular 
telephone numbers captured by the  lawful use of a 
TDR under a  s. 492.2 warrant. Subscriber 
information from TSPs is necessary “to give effect 
to” issued TDR warrants. Amicus curiae, appointed 
to oppose the Crown’s position, submitted that 
interpreting transmission data to include subscriber 
information would broaden the scope of a s. 492.2 
warrant and go beyond what Parliament intended.
Assistance Order & Subscriber Information
Justice Hoegg, speaking  for the majority, concluded 
that the modern principle of statutory interpretation 
supported the “view that section 487.02 assistance 
orders for subscriber information are ‘reasonably 
required to give effect to’ section 492.2 TDR 
warrants and are therefore available to require 
[TSPs] to provide the subscriber information 
associated with lawfully captured telephone 
numbers pursuant to the lawful execution of a 
section 492.2 TDR warrant.” In so interpreting the 
Criminal Code provisions, Just ice Hoegg 
recognized that legislated police powers to 
investigate crime needed to be balanced against the 
privacy interests of individuals. She stated:
In the result, it is my view that Parliament’s 
purpose of providing police with the power to 
fight crime with real time information by 
enacting the 2014 amendments to the Code is 
realized by enabling police to obtain assistance 
orders to require [TSPs] to reveal the subscriber 
information associated with the lawfully 
captured telephone numbers through the use of 
a TDR warrant, so as to give meaning to the 
captured data and thereby give effect to the 
purpose of obtaining a TDR warrant.
Finally, to the extent that the privacy rights of 
callers can be said to be affected by this 
interpretation, I say that Parliament has 
considered this point, and “rationally” 
determined, that its objective in enacting 
section 492.2 is substantially important to 
society’s well-being and sufficiently important 
to warrant limiting, “proportionally” certain 
rights and freedoms. [reference omitted, paras. 
60-61]
 
The majority ruled that the provincial court had 
jurisdiction to grant the assistance order requiring 
TSPs to reveal the subscriber information associated 
with telephone numbers lawfully  captured under 
the lawful execution of a TDR warrant.   The matter 
was remitted back  to provincial court for a 
determination of whether an assistance order was 
appropriate on the specific facts of this case.
 
Another View
Justice Green, in dissent, disagreed with 
the majority that the phrase “to give 
effect to”  in s. 487.02 relating to 
assis tance orders authorized the 
obtaining of subscriber information as applied to 
the operation of a TDR warrant. In Justice Green’s 
view, an interpretation that facilitated the police 
investigation to which the warrant related would 
enable information to be obtained that went 
beyond the scope of the information that was 
available under the warrant itself. He noted that an 
assistance order was not a stand-alone provision 
authorizing the obtaining of information. Rather, an 
assistance order is dependent upon another 
authorization, order or warrant and is designed to 
“assist”. An assistance order cannot, by its 
“[S]ection 487.02 assistance orders for subscriber information are ‘reasonably required 
to give effect to’ section 492.2 TDR warrants and are therefore available to require 
[TSPs] to provide the subscriber information associated with lawfully captured 
telephone numbers pursuant to the lawful execution of a section 492.2 TDR warrant.”
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operation, extend the authorization of the warrant. 
If information is not within the scope of the TDR 
warrant, then an assistance order cannot be used to 
obtain it. Otherwise, the  reach of the TDR warrant 
would be extended beyond that which it authorized 
the police to collect.
 
“The logical result flowing from the  statutory 
structural relationship of the assistance order to 
the TDR [warrant], together with the ordinary 
dictionary meaning of the key words in section 
487.02 and their use in other contexts, points to 
the scope of the assistance order being limited to 
making the operationalization of the warrant 
effective’,” said Justice Green.  “It does not extend 
to providing assistance to the police investigation 
generally or to make it more meaningful or 
efficacious outside of the provision of the 
information allowed to be  accessed by the 
underlying warrant.” Justice  Green would dismiss 
the Crown appeal and uphold the provincial court 
judge’s refusal to issue an assistance order to 
provide customer name and address information in 
conjunction with the issuance of a TDR warrant.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PHOTOS NEED NOT BE 
AUTHENTICATED BY 
PHOTOGRAPHER
R. v. B.S., 2019 ONCA 72
Ontario’s highest court has found that 
photographs do not need to be 
authenticated by the person taking 
them, but may be authenticated by a 
person appearing in them. In this 
case, the complainant of sexual offences against 
the accused was able to identify herself and the 
accused in photographs. She was also able to 
explain the interactions depicted in the photos, the 
locations where the photos were taken and provide 
a reasoned explanation for the approximate date 
range for the photos. She was also able to explain 
her belief that her sister was the likely 
photographer. As a result, the trial judge did not err 
in receiving the photos into evidence.
RECOGNITION EVIDENCE NOT 
INHERENTLY UNRELIABLE LIKE 
STRANGER EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY
R. v. Field, 2018 BCCA 253
A hotel clerk was robbed by two 
masked men armed with a  firearm. 
Shor t ly a f ter, two indiv iduals 
attempted to car-jack a vehicle. 
Fol lowing the robbery, pol ice 
investigators circulated an email containing still 
photos taken from inside the taxi of the individuals 
who were thought to have committed the offences. 
One of the emails was received by a probation 
officer who had dealt with the  accused. She 
subsequently  testified that she recognized the 
accused as one of the individuals in the photos. She 
had met with him about five times in the year the 
robbery took place.  
The probation officer forwarded the photos to 
another probation officer who had also dealt with 
the accused. This second probation officer also 
identified the accused from the still photos. She first 
met with the  accused in the year of the robbery and 
had subsequently met with him between five to 45 
minutes on about five occasions. The accused was 
charged with robbery, wearing a mask to commit 
an indictable offence and the attempted theft of the 
vehicle.
British Columbia Provincial Court
Both the  taxi driver and the victim of 
the car-jacking incident provided in-
dock identification of the accused. The 
judge also admitted the identification 
evidence with respect to the probation officers. The 
first probation officer said she was “extremely 
certain” that she recognized the accused from the 
photos while the second probation officer was 
“very  certain” of her identification. Both probation 
officers identified particular characteristics and 
details about the accused’s face and its shape to 
explain why they were so certain of their 
identification.
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The judge found the eyewitness identification by 
the two individuals who saw the perpetrator of the 
crime at the time of the offence fraught with frailty 
and dangerous to rely on. The judge described the 
best still photo of the individual in the taxi as “not 
excellent”, but nevertheless concluded there were 
“striking similarities between the photo and [the 
accused].” However, he was reluctant to rely on his 
own assessment and, instead, concluded the two 
probation officers would be in a  better position to 
make the assessment as they had dealt with the 
accused in the year when the offence occurred. 
In the judge’s view, the quality of the photos was 
not too poor to permit reliable  identification. He 
admitted the recognition evidence of both 
probation officers. He held that “both witnesses 
have had the appropriate degree of familiarity 
with the accused due to the nature  of their 
relationship and [their] contact with the  accused 
to assist me.” Their evidence satisfied him beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person sitting in the taxi 
was the accused. That conclusion, together with 
other evidence, resulted in the accused’s conviction 
for robbery and being masked with intent to 
commit an indictable offence. On the other hand, 
the judge was not satisfied that the  identification in 
relation to the car-jacking  was sufficient to establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the accused 
was acquitted of that charge.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused chal lenged, 
among other th ings , the 
admissibility of the recognition 
evidence because the trial 
judge failed to consider the quality of the photos 
and improperly  considered the weight to be placed 
on the recognition evidence in light of this 
deficiency.
Identification Evidence
Justice Hunter, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
first recognized that “it is well known that 
identification evidence can be unreliable.” 
However, “the degree of re l iab i l i ty o f 
identification evidence is a function of the 
particular circumstances in which it is tendered.” 
The Appeal Court went on to explain different types 
of identification evidence:
There are at least three distinct types of 
identification evidence that may be tendered, 
each with its own reliability characteristics:
(i) Eyewitness evidence by a stranger: 
Experience has shown that eyewitness 
evidence proffered by a stranger to the 
accused is the least reliable identification 
evidence. It has been described as 
“inherently unreliable”. In light of the many 
instances in which identification has 
proved erroneous, the trier of fact must be 
cognizant of "the inherent frailties of 
identification evidence arising from the 
psychological fact of the unreliability of 
human observation and recollection.
(ii) Identification by the trier of fact through 
photographic evidence: On occasion, the 
trier of fact will have the benefit of 
photographic evidence taken at or 
sufficiently near the scene of the crime to 
have probative value in determining the 
identity of the perpetrator. As long as the 
photographic evidence is of sufficient 
clarity and quality to permit identification 
of the person shown in the photo, the 
evidence can be admitted and weighed 
with other evidence by the trier of fact.
(iii) Recognition evidence: The Crown may 
also choose to tender opinion evidence 
from a person or persons who can identify 
the individual shown in a photo or video. 
This evidence is admissible if the witness 
had a prior acquaintance with the accused 
and is therefore in a better position than the 
trier of fact to conclude whether the 
individual in the photo is the accused. 
[emphasis added, references omitted, para. 
23]
“Experience has shown that eyewitness 
evidence proffered by a stranger to the 
accused is the least reliable 
identification evidence. It has been 
described as ‘inherently unreliable’.”
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Admissibility 
W h e n r e c o g n i t i o n 
evidence based on 
photographic or video 
evidence is tendered, a 
t r i a l j u d g e m u s t 
conduct a  voir dire  to 
determine its admissibility. In doing so, the trial 
judge must determine “whether the recognition 
witnesses are in a better position than the trial 
judge as a result of their prior acquaintance with 
the accused to determine whether the person 
depicted in the photo or video is the accused. 
Provided the trial judge is satisfied that the image 
in the photo or video is capable of identification, 
issues as to the  quality of the photographic or 
video evidence will go to the weight of the 
evidence. Once admitted, the [judge] will need to 
consider the recognition evidence along with the 
evidence as a  whole to determine whether the 
Crown has established identification beyond a 
reasonable doubt. “
In this case, the Appeal Court found the trial judge 
did not err in finding the recognition evidence 
admissible  on the basis of the quality of the  photos. 
“The question for the  trial judge was whether the 
prior acquaintance of the two probation officers 
with [the accused] was such that they were in a 
better position than the  judge to assess whether 
the photos were that of [the accused],” said Justice 
Hunter. “The trial judge considered the 
circumstances of the  [probation officers’] 
interactions with [the accused] and, importantly, 
the time frame of those interactions, in 
concluding that their evidence would be helpful to 
him.”
Weight
The accused’s submission that the trial judge 
treated the certainty of the probation officers 
identification evidence to negate concerns with the 
source of that identification, was rejected. “While 
it is important to scrutinize carefully any form of 
identification evidence, recognition evidence does 
not carry  with it the inherent unreliability of 
eyewitness testimony of a stranger,” said Justice 
Hunter. Here, the judge properly considered the 
quality of the photos in relying on the recognition 
evidence of the probation officers who were well 
acquainted with the accused, particularly  in the 
year the photos were taken. The trial judge did not 
err in weighing the recognition evidence.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
GOOD FAITH FAVOURS 
ADMISSION OF DRUG 
EVIDENCE UNDER s. 24(2)
R. v. Wawrykiewicz, 2019 ONCA 21
Police  were requested by hotel 
management to enter a  hotel room 
occupied by the accused after 
compla in t s were made abou t 
excessive noise and the odour of 
marijuana reported near the room. The officers 
went to the room, knocked and identified 
themselves. They did not have a warrant. After 
there  was no response, they opened the lock with a 
key. When the accused released the safety latch 
and stepped back, the police entered the room. In 
plain view in the hotel bathroom, the police 
observed evidence of drug possession. They then 
obtained a warrant and seized cocaine and crack 
cocaine in trafficking quantities. The police also 
executed a  search warrant for the  accused’s car 
and seized more crack cocaine. The police also 
seized two cell phones incident to the accused’s 
arrest and examined them after obtaining a search 
warrant. The phone searches led the police to 
obtain two drug related search warrants about two 
“While it is important to scrutinize carefully any form of identification evidence, 
recognition evidence does not carry with it the inherent unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony of a stranger.”
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months later at two addresses associated with the 
accused. During those searches, the police seized 
significant quantities of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, 
drug trafficking paraphernalia and drug proceeds. 
 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused sought the  exclusion of the 
cell phones and the  other evidence 
seized. He argued that he was subject 
to an unreasonable search when the 
police unlawfully entered his hotel room. Since the 
information required for the subsequent search 
warrants came from the seized cell phones, those 
warranted searches resulted in s. 8 Charter 
breaches and that evidence should be excluded as 
well.
The judge agreed that the entry into the hotel room 
by the police was unlawful and therefore the 
unreasonable hotel room search tainted the 
subsequent searches. However, the judge ruled all 
of the evidence admissible under s. 24(2). In his 
view, the police officers were acting in good faith 
when they illegally entered the hotel room. As well, 
the circumstances (a party reveller smoking 
marihuana and causing a ruckus in a hotel room) 
lowered the accused’s expectation of privacy, and 
the evidence seized was reliable and crucial to the 
prosecution of trafficking charges involving very 
serious quantities of drugs. The accused was 
convicted of all charges and sentenced to 10 years 
in prison less credit for pre-sentence custody and 
strict house arrest bail conditions. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended, in 
part, that the trial judge erred in 
admitting the evidence under s. 
24(2). In his view, the trial 
judge incorrectly concluded that the absence of 
bad faith was the equivalent of good faith.
Good Faith 
Here, the trial judge accepted the police officer’s 
evidence that he  was asked by the hotel manager to 
evict the occupants of the hotel room despite the 
manager not remembering doing so. And the trial 
judge was also entitled to accept the officer’s 
evidence that he believed that the hotel manager’s 
request gave him the lawful authority to enter the 
hotel room. 
“Nor did the trial judge equate the absence of bad 
faith with good faith, or base his good faith 
findings solely  on the subjective belief of the 
officers that they were acting lawfully,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “It is clear that the trial judge 
considered the reasonableness of the officers’ 
beliefs before making his good faith findings. He 
noted that there was a dearth of case law 
regarding the statutory authority to enter a hotel 
room before finding that [the officer] believed he 
was acting under the authority of [Ontario’s 
Trespass to Property Act]  and was attempting to 
comply with its requirements. He then assessed 
the reasonableness of the  belief by other officers 
that the [accused] had implicitly invited them to 
enter the hotel room.”
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from 2017 
ONSC 569.
STATEMENT ADMITTED DESPITE 
SERIOUS s. 10(b) CHARTER 
BREACH
R. v. Storry, 2018 BCCA 483
The accused, who was on parole for 
murder, and another man were 
arrested following the violent attack 
of a man who lived in the same 
rooming house as the accused. The 
victim had been repeatedly  struck with two bats 
and sustained serious injuries to his head and body, 
including two broken arms. On arrest, the accused 
was advised of his s. 10(b) right to counsel and he 
was cautioned about speaking to police. The 
accused advised the officer that he understood his 
rights and that he wished to speak to his wife who 
was a lawyer. On the way to the  police station, the 
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accused repeatedly asked to speak to his wife. He 
maintained she was a lawyer and said that, if she 
could not act as his lawyer, she would help him 
find a criminal lawyer to assist him. The officer said 
he would help the accused speak with a lawyer but 
advised him that he could only speak with his wife 
if she was a practicing lawyer.
At the police station, the officer called the 
accused’s wife. She confirmed that she had 
completed law school but she was not admitted as 
a member of any law society and therefore was not 
a practicing lawyer. The officer claimed he then 
arranged for, at the accused’s request, contact with 
a lawyer from the Legal Aid phone line. The 
accused spoke with the lawyer by phone in a 
private interview room for about 30 minutes. At the 
end of the telephone conversation, the officer asked 
the accused if he had talked to a lawyer and if he 
had understood the lawyer’s advice, to which the 
accused replied yes to both questions.
A detective interviewed the accused the following 
morning. At the beginning of the interview, the 
accused confirmed that he had spoken to a lawyer. 
The detective pointed out that the interview was 
being audio and video recorded, to which the 
accused replied, “Yeah the lawyer told me about 
this and he told me that I shouldn’t have nothing 
to say about fuck  all … because uh everything 
that’s said … can be used against me in a court of 
law.”  The accused then volunteered his account of 
what had transpired, but later claimed that it was 
false because  he figured his parole would be 
revoked no matter what. And he wanted to ensure 
that his co-accused remained out of custody to care 
for the accused’s wife. The accused was jointly 
charged with attempted murder and aggravated 
assault. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
There was no dispute that the accused’s 
statement to the detective was a false 
account of the circumstances of the 
a l l e g e d o f f e n c e . T h e C r o w n 
nevertheless wanted this false statement admitted 
for the purposes of cross-examining the accused if 
he testified. The accused, however, did not want his 
statement admitted. First, it was false and therefore 
unreliable. Second, he argued that his s. 10(b) right 
to counsel had been breached. Although he spoke 
with a lawyer and was told to remain silent, he 
claimed that he wanted to have his wife make 
arrangements for a specific  criminal lawyer. He 
submitted he was prevented from doing so because 
the police did not permit him to speak with his 
wife. He said that he did not ask to speak  to a legal 
aid lawyer but was handed the phone after being 
told by the  arresting officer that he had to talk to a 
lawyer. He believed the police had arranged for the 
lawyer he spoke to. 
The voir dire judge concluded that the police 
violated the accused’s s. 10(b) rights. In the judge’s 
view, the accused was entitled to request counsel 
through a person other than a lawyer.  Here, there 
was no “reason to believe that the police 
investigation would be compromised if they had 
waited for [the accused] to arrange counsel 
through his wife.” But the judge nevertheless 
admitted the statement under s. 24(2) because its 
admission would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Although the breach was 
serious, the accused did speak to a lawyer, 
understood the advice he received and never 
expressed any dissatisfaction with that advice. 
While the Crown did not tender the accused’s 
statement as part of its case, it was used at trial to 
cross-examination him. The accused was 
subsequently convicted of aggravated assault.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused submitted, in part, 
that the voir dire  judge erred 
by not excluding his false 
statement as evidence under s. 
24(2). In his opinion, this error may have affected 
the trial verdict.
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal first considered the s. 10(b) 
right and what it required the police to do:
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A detainee who chooses to exercise their right 
to counsel is entitled to be given a reasonable 
opportunity to contact counsel of their choice 
or to contact a third party in order to facilitate 
that contact, before he or she is questioned.
However, the right to counsel is not absolute. 
The detainee also has an obligation to act 
reasonably in exercising their right to counsel. 
…
The police are not required to monitor the 
quality of the advice given, but may assume 
that the detainee is satisfied with the exercised 
right to counsel and commence an investigative 
interview unless the detainee discloses that 
they are not satisfied with the advice they 
received.
The purpose of the Legal Aid line is to provide 
detainees with immediate access to legal 
advice so that their interests against self-
incrimination are protected and they are treated 
fairly in the criminal process. The ability of a 
detainee to obtain legal advice from duty 
counsel, as an alternative to speaking with 
counsel of choice, will mitigate the seriousness 
of a s.  10(b) breach where: (i) the detainee 
understands the advice; (ii) is silent with respect 
to any concerns about the adequacy of the 
advice; and (iii) the record is silent on whether 
there was any reasonable likelihood of 
contacting counsel of choice at the time. 
[references omitted, paras. 55-58]
Here, the trial judge found the breach of the 
accused’s s. 10(b) right to be serious. However, he 
weighed each of the s. 24(2) admissibility factors 
and concluded the serious breach was mitigated by 
the accused’s ability to obtain adequate legal 
advice from duty counsel, which he understood but 
chose to ignore. “I agree with the voir dire  judge 
that [the  accused’s] evidence about what he might 
or might not have done, had he been given the 
opportunity to speak with counsel of choice, was 
entirely speculative,” said Justice Smith, writing the 
Appeal Court’s opinion. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
‘SYSTEMIC’ BREACHES 
AGGRAVATE SERIOUSNESS OF 
POLICE CONDUCT
R. v. Ippak, 2018 NUCA 3
 
The police received an anonymous 
tip that the accused was onboard an 
incoming plane from Montreal to 
Sanikiluaq, Nunavut, and that he was 
carrying “at least 10-15 mickeys of 
alcohol”. Alcohol is prohibited in the dry 
community of Sanikiluaq, a small hamlet.  Two 
police officers drove to the airport and approached 
the accused after he deplaned. They took him into a 
private room, advised him he  was under 
investigation for transporting contraband liquor and 
gave him the standard police warning that he did 
not need to say anything  to police. He was not, 
however, advised of his right to counsel under s. 
10(b). 
The accused said he was not carrying liquor and 
told police  they could search his suitcase. An 
officer took the accused to retrieve his bag from the 
airplane  baggage cart and they then went to a 
police vehicle outside. The officer took  out a 
Consent To Search Form and explained it to the 
accused. The accused signed the form and his bag 
was searched. As soon as the officer opened the 
bag, he smelled a strong aroma of marihuana. The 
accused immediately asked for the search to stop, 
but he was then arrested for possessing marihuana. 
The accused was advised of his 10(b) right to 
counsel and a search of his bag revealed 3.7 lbs. of 
raw marihuana. He was charged with possessing 
marihuana for the purpose of trafficking.
Nunavut Court of Justice
The police acknowledged that the 
anonymous call provided insufficient 
grounds to obtain a search warrant or 
arrest the accused, since such tips were 
common and frequently  inaccurate. As for why he 
didn’t provide the accused with his s. 10(b) right to 
counsel, the officer stated, “it was just a routine  – 
routine check at the airport.”  The officer also 
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testified that, even if the accused had not offered to 
have his bag searched, the police procedure  in the 
circumstances would have been to request that the 
accused let the police search his bag.  If individuals 
said “no” to signing the  Consent To Search Form, 
then the police would take no further action. If 
consent was given, searches and sometimes 
seizures, took place.  The evidence was that the 
police in Sanikiluaq frequently attended the airport 
to detain and ask individuals for permission to 
search their bags without reasonable and probable 
grounds for a  search warrant or an arrest, and 
without instructing them of their right to counsel. 
The Crown conceded that the police breached the 
accused’s ss. 8, 9, and 10 Charter rights. However, 
the Crown argued that the breaches were not 
serious and the evidence seized was critical to the 
case and therefore should be admissible. The judge 
agreed, and the evidence was admitted. The 
accused was convicted of trafficking and sentenced 
to an 18-month conditional sentence. 
Nunavut Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in finding the 
evidence admissible. The 
Court of Appeal agreed, 
holding the proper factors under s. 24(2) were not 
considered in admitting the evidence. As such, a 
new analysis was conducted and the evidence was 
excluded. 
Seriousness of Police Conduct
The Charter breaches were serious and included 
wilful disregard for the  accused’s rights. The police 
did not have reasonable grounds to arrest or search 
the accused without a warrant. Nor did the police 
even have a reasonable suspicion that the accused 
had done anything unlawful. “Not only were the 
various tips received by Sanikiluaq police relatively 
unreliable, but the anonymous and unconfirmed 
tip that lead to this investigation was not spurred 
by anything more than ‘routine’ police procedure 
because alcohol was viewed as ‘one of the most 
important things to investigate in Nunavut’,” said 
the majority. “That is, it was solely driven by 
the  modus operandi  of the  RCMP in the small 
hamlet of Sanikiluaq.” Not only did the officer 
testify that subjectively he did not believe  the 
accused was carrying alcohol, objectively there 
was no reasonable grounds on the totality of the 
circumstances. “This police investigation was one 
in which these officers knowingly contravened the 
rights of the [accused], and that they do so 
regularly to other individuals – a fact which makes 
this conduct blatant and extremely serious,”  said 
the majority. “On a more general level, the fact 
that police want to investigate an anonymous tip, 
does not automatically and legally mean the police 
can and should detain an individual. Nor does it 
give police a carte blanche on the manner in which 
they do so. Treating such detainees with civility, 
while knowingly breaching their rights, does not 
lessen the seriousness of the breaches or equate to 
good faith or fairness.” 
Here, there was no legal uncertainly and the officer 
knew he did not have grounds to detain and search 
the accused. The police “set out to the airport 
to  deliberately  breach the  Charter,  as they knew 
they had no reasonable grounds for detention, 
arrest or a search.” In sum, “the officers 
unconstitutionally detained, questioned and 
searched the [accused’s] personal luggage, while at 
the same time failing to inform him of the right to 
retain and instruct counsel which in all likelihood, 
would have resulted in him being advised of the 
unlawful nature of the police conduct and 
affirmed that he need not offer or consent to any 
illegal search.” Moreover, the breaches were 
systemic:
Aggravating the seriousness of the breaches in 
this case, and weighing further in favour of 
exclusion, is that this matter was not the result 
“This police investigation was one in which these officers knowingly contravened the 
rights of the [accused], and that they do so regularly to other individuals – a fact which 
makes this conduct blatant and extremely serious.”
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of an isolated incident. The systemic and 
institutional nature of the approach used by the 
police in investigating anonymous tips in 
Sanikiluaq, “is serious, and not lightly to be 
condoned.” That this occurs in a small 
community in Nunavut which may have its 
own particular problems with alcohol and 
drugs is largely, if not wholly, irrelevant in the 
face of blatant Charter breaches by those in law 
enforcement who are empowered and trained 
to follow proper investigative procedures and 
respect the Charter  rights of those they detain. 
[para. 39]
Impact on the Accused
The unlawful detention and search impacted the 
accused’s liberty and privacy interests, and the s. 
10(b) breach impacted his right to make a 
meaningful and informed choice about whether to 
speak to police and consent to a search of his 
baggage:
 
Although arguably the [accused’s] detention in 
this matter was relatively brief and his 
expectation of privacy somewhat lowered in his 
checked baggage on a plane or at an airport…, 
however, being stopped and subjected to a 
search by police without justification impacts 
on an individual’s “rightful expectation of 
liberty and privacy in a way that is much more 
than trivial. … A person in the [accused’s] 
position has every expectation of being left 
alone” unless lawful grounds exist for detention 
and search. The breaches in this matter were 
therefore a significant intrusion into the 
[accused’s] ss. 8 and 9  Charter-protected 
interests.
The breach of the [accused’s] s. 10(b) rights is 
also significant. The wilful decision not to 
inform or provide the [accused] with his right 
to counsel was not of a mere technical nature, 
nor was it a breach that was unlikely to have 
impacted the [accused’s] understanding of his 
situation or his rights. Rather, the nature of the 
breach had a significant impact on the 
[accused’s] right to receive meaningful legal 
advice about his right to silence and his right 
not to consent to a search of his baggage. … 
[The accused’s] legal vulnerability in this matter 
was significant, so too was his need for legal 
assistance. The actions of the police officers 
were a significant intrusion on the [accused’s] 
Charter-protected interests weighing in favour 
of exclusion. [paras. 46-47]
Society’s Interest 
The drugs seized from the accused’s luggage were 
highly reliable evidence and essential to the 
Crown’s case for the serious offence of trafficking. 
This favoured admission but did not outbalance the 
other factors. “To condone the serious nature of 
the Charter breaches in this matter which resulted 
in a significant intrusion on the [accused’s] rights, 
would undermine society’s confidence in the 
justice system and damage the long-term 
reputation of the administration of justice,” said 
the majority. “While the need for disassociation 
from police  misconduct will not always trump the 
truth-seeking function of the criminal courts, the 
seriousness of the offence and the reliability  of the 
impugned evidence do not outweigh the factors 
warranting exclusion in this matter.”
A Second Opinion
Justice Berger, writing his own decision, 
agreed that the evidence should have 
been excluded. He did, however, also 
consider Inuit law and culture in 
assessing the  s. 24(2) factors. “Nunavut and 
Sanikiluaq are not  Charter  free zones,”  he said. 
“The protections that are afforded to all Canadian 
citizens apply  with full force and effect throughout 
the country.” 
First, he found the police conduct to be serious:
“Aggravating the seriousness of the 
breaches in this case, and weighing 
further in favour of exclusion, is that this 
matter was not the result of an isolated 
incident. The systemic and institutional 
nature of the approach used by the 
police in investigating anonymous tips in 
Sanikiluaq, ‘is serious, and not lightly to 
be condoned’.”
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The actions of the police in the case at bar 
were the product of a systemic practice 
whereby individual members of the community 
were improperly detained when they arrived at 
the airport. Such practices, of course, have 
implications for the [accused], but also for the 
Inuit community at large. Police action on the 
facts of this case cannot be construed as 
equivalent to the interventions of elders with 
social authority within the Inuit community. It 
follows that the Canadian state actor, engaged 
in the enforcement of Canadian law cannot be 
said to be entitled to the same deference in the 
context of traditional Inuit maligait or 
tirigusuusiit.
The investigative detention of the [accused] was 
both unjustifiable and arbitrary. [The officer] 
acknowledged from the outset and throughout 
his dealings with the [accused] that he “had no 
reasons to suspect anything…. It was just a 
routine call… I didn’t even believe that he had 
anything on his person at that time.” Moreover, 
he failed to inform [the accused] of his right to 
counsel. [paras. 95-96]
Second, Justice Berger concluded the impact of the 
police conduct on the Charter-protected interests of 
the accused, when considered along with Inuit law, 
was profound:
While the Charter provides common protection 
for all Canadians, there may be space within 
the aboriginal law perspective to consider the 
socio-cultural impact on the [accused] by 
breaching his rights. My imperfect lens, focused 
as it is on the limited reading that I have done 
of the cited publications on aboriginal law, 
leads me to conclude that under Inuit law a 
wrongdoer such as the [accused] would face 
much lower jeopardy and would almost 
certainly be reintegrated into the community as 
long as he welcomed counselling from elders 
and changed his behaviour. Instead, the 
[accused] in this case whose recorded 
conviction will follow him for the rest of his 
life, was sentenced to a form of imprisonment 
(albeit in his own home). The breach of the 
[accused’s]  Charter-protected interests resulted 
in a significant differential negative effect on 
him flowing directly from the actions of officers 
of the State. The unlawful detention and search 
in this matter impacted the [accused’s] liberty 
and privacy interests. The s 10(b) breach further 
infringed the [accused’s] right to make a 
meaningful and informed choice about whether 
to speak to police and consent to a search of 
his baggage. Importantly, the recording of a 
conviction and the punishment that was 
imposed under Canadian law, operates directly 
in conflict with the objective of Inuit law to 
reintegrate the individual and preserve the 
community.  [para. 99]
As for society’s interest in adjudicating the matter 
on its merits, Justice Berger had this to say:
Inuit law’s approach to evidence of wrongdoing 
relies almost entirely on the cleansing power of 
the offender admitting his wrongdoing. 
Rein tegra t ion in to the communi ty i s 
paramount. The admission of the marihuana – 
the physical evidence of crime – is not a matter 
of concern (apart from forfeiture) to the Inuit 
legal system.
The [accused] was in breach of h i s 
community’s admonition to ban alcohol and 
mood-altering drugs from Sanikiluaq. Both 
Canadian law and Inuit law recognize his 
transgression; they differ, however, in 
addressing it. Canadian society’s preoccupation 
with adjudication (read: conviction and 
sentencing) does not accord with Inuit culture’s 
principal focus on reintegration of the 
individual and preservation of the community.
Yet when Canadian law is married to and 
reconciled with Inuit law and culture in the 
application of the  Grant  factors, both favour 
exclusion of the evidence.  [paras. 102-104]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, the evidence 
was excluded and an acquittal was entered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“Nunavut and Sanikiluaq are not Charter free zones. The protections that are afforded 
to all Canadian citizens apply with full force and effect throughout the country.”
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2018
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 
2018. In December there were 112 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents a +8% increase 
over the number of deaths occurring in December 
2017 but a -6% decrease over November 2018. 
In 2018, there were a total of 1,489 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This is an increase of two (2) 
deaths over the 2017 numbers (1,487). 
Overall, the 2018 statistics amount to about 4 
people dying every day of the year.
The 1,489  overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 347%  increase over 2013. The report 
also attributed fentanyl laced drugs as accounting 
for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were the hardest hit in 2018 
with 386  illicit drug overdose deaths followed by 
50-59 year-olds at 337 deaths. People aged 40-49 
years-old accounted for 332 deaths while those 
aged 19-29 had 293  deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 382  followed by Surrey (210), 
Victoria (94), Kelowna (55), Kamloops (48),  Prince 
George (46), Burnaby (43) and Abbotsford (40). 
Males continue to die at 
a l m o s t a 4 : 1 r a t i o 
compared to females. In 
2018, 1,194 males had 
died while  there were 
295 female deaths.
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The 2018 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (86.4%) occurred inside while 
11.7% occurred outside. For 28 deaths, the 
location was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 33 months preceding the 
declaration (Jul 2013-Mar 2016) totaled 1,292. The 
number of deaths in the 33 months following the 
declaration (Apr 2016-Dec 2018) totaled 3,749. 
This is an increase of 190%.
28174
59
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Other Residence
Other Inside
Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2008 to 
December 31, 2018.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General, Coroners Service. February 7, 2019.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were fentanyl, which 
was detected in 78.6%  of deaths, cocaine (49.2%), methamphetamine/amphetamine (30.9%), ethyl 
alcohol (26.2%), and heroin (20.3%). 
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 Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC, 2018
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CI INFORMATION SUFFICIENTLY 
CONFIRMED: WARRANT VALID
R. v. Soltan, 2019 ONCA 8
Police received information from a 
confidential informer (CI) who 
personally knew the accused. The CI 
said that the accused was dealing a 
variety of drugs from a particular 
apartment unit where the CI said the accused lived. 
The CI provided details as to the types and 
quantities of drugs he had seen in the accused’s 
apartment, and said that the accused was never out 
of drugs. The CI was immersed within the criminal 
subculture, had provided accurate and reliable 
information to the police before, and was motivated 
by an incentive they would receive upon the 
success of the investigation. A warrant was granted 
to search the accused’s apartment and, as a  result of 
the search, the police seized drugs and other items. 
Ontario Court of Justice
Among other things, the accused 
submitted that the search warrant was 
invalid and thus his rights under s. 8 of 
the Charter had been breached. The 
judge concluded that the totality of the 
circumstances justified the issuance of the warrant. 
The information provided by the informer was 
sufficiently confirmed by the police and there was 
reliable evidence that might reasonably be 
believed. The warrant was valid and the accused 
was convicted of various offences, including 
possession for the purpose of trafficking a number 
of drugs. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended, in 
p a r t , t h a t t h e r e w e r e 
insufficient grounds for the 
issuance of the search warrant. 
This argument, however was rejected. 
In this case, the information provided by the CI 
was specific and based on first-hand 
knowledge. The defence acknowledged that the 
information was compelling. The CI had 
provided credible and reliable information to 
the police in the past, and many of the details 
provided by the CI in this case were 
corroborated by the police investigation. The 
in format ion provided by the CI met 
the Debot criteria and, together with all of the 
other information that was before the issuing 
j u s t i c e , j u s t i f i e d t h e i s s u a n c e o f a 
warrant. [para. 15]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO 
WARRANT SEARCH OF 
APARTMENT: CONVICTION 
UPHELD
R. v. Lee, 2018 ONCA 1067
The police received information from 
three  confidential informers (CIs) that 
the accused and his girlfriend were 
trafficking cocaine from the accused’s 
c a r . T h e p o l i c e c o n d u c t e d 
surveillance to corroborate  these tips. In particular, 
the police orchestrated an undercover purchase of 
cocaine from the accused using specific bank 
notes, the serial numbers of which they recorded. 
The police subsequently stopped the car that the 
accused was driving. His girlfriend was a 
passenger.  A search of the accused at roadside 
located 4.3 grams of marijuana in his sock. At the 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Debot Criteria
“First, was the information predicting the 
commission of a criminal offence compelling? 
Second, where the information was based on a ‘tip’ 
originating from a source outside the police, was 
that source credible? Finally, was the information corroborated by 
the police investigation prior to making the decision to conduct 
the search?” -  R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 SCR 1140. 





   
    
  

   




 
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
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       

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 
 
 
 
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 

    

        

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 
        


 
 
 
 



   
      

 


        

        

       



 

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


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


    

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police station, a strip search of the accused yielded 
no evidence. A strip search of his girlfriend netted 
police an ounce of cocaine, which she had 
secreted in her vagina. 
The police then obtained a  warrant to search the 
accused’s apartment. They discovered 700 grams of 
powder cocaine, 700 grams of crack cocaine, and 
$1,200 in Canadian currency, including the three 
bills used during the undercover purchase. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused brought applications under 
the Charter arguing several of his rights 
had been violated. The judge, however, 
found no breaches of the  accused’s 
rights. But he  did find the strip search of the 
accused’s gir l f r iend to be unreasonable. 
Nevertheless the drugs found on her were admitted 
as evidence. The accused was convicted of 
possessing cocaine  for the  purpose of trafficking 
and his girlfriend was also found guilty.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused contended, among 
other arguments, that the 
Information to Obtain (ITO) 
contained insufficient grounds 
to authorize the search of his apartment. He 
submitted that the  warrant was granted because the 
issuing justice assumed that, since the accused was 
a drug dealer, the police were entitled to search his 
apartment. The accused also suggested any 
reference to the  cocaine found secreted on his 
girlfriend’s person following  her illegal strip search 
ought to have been excised from the ITO. The 
Crown, on the other hand, argued that, even when 
reference to the drugs of the girlfriend’s search was 
excised from the ITO, there was still a sufficient 
basis to authorize the warrant.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that, 
even with his girlfriend’s strip search excised, there 
was a sufficient basis to obtain the warrant to 
search the apartment:
 
On the night of the takedown, the [accused] 
and [his girlfriend] were observed in the 
[accused’s] car in the Barrie area. The police 
observed three drug transactions. After the final 
transaction, the car was driven back to [the 
apartment building]. Using a key fob, the 
[accused] drove into the underground parking 
lot. He emerged hours later, having changed his 
c lo thes . A f t e r sea rch ing Min i s t r y o f 
Transportation databases, the police learned 
that [the apartment] was the [accused’s] mailing 
address. The police subsequently confirmed 
with building management that the [accused] 
lived in Unit 1611.
[The accused’s lawyer] argues that there was no 
reasonable basis for the issuing justice to be 
satisfied that the cocaine discovered on [his 
girlfriend] originated from the apartment. 
However, the police were searching for more 
than just the cocaine. The ITO specified the 
following items: “Cocaine, Packaging, Currency 
including and not limited to Canadian $20 bills 
bearing [3 serial numbers], Debt List, Scales 
and Telecommunication Devices.” In short, the 
police wished to search for evidence of the 
[accused’s] drug trafficking activities. 
In our view, there was a sufficient basis to 
authorize this search, even though the ITO did 
not contain an opinion from the affiant about 
the typical behaviour of alleged drug dealers, in 
terms of where they keep their money, supplies, 
and tools of the trade. Significantly, the fact that 
the [accused] returned to his home after 
conducting three drug transactions and then 
went out again, differently attired, tied his drug 
trafficking activities to [the apartment].
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“[T]he fact that the [accused] returned 
to his home after conducting three drug 
transactions and then went out again, 
differently attired, tied his drug 
trafficking activities to [the apartment].”
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ARREST TO BE ASSESSED IN ‘A 
PRACTICAL, NON-TECHNICAL & 
COMMON-SENSE WAY’
R. v. Penner, 2019 MBCA 8
A confidential informer (CI) told 
police that the accused and another 
man would be selling cocaine 
together in Winkler, Manitoba that 
evening. The CI was a drug user 
familiar with both men. The CI had given 
information to police 10 times previously in the 
prior year; one time resulting in arrests where drugs 
and drug monies were seized. Police conducted 
surveillance over the dinner hour on the men. 
While that was occurring, the CI advised police 
that the two men were presently selling cocaine. 
After witnessing the two men attend to three brief 
meetings believed to be  drug deals, they were 
arrested. Drugs and drug monies were seized.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The lead investigator testified that, while 
not all of the CI's previous information 
could be confirmed, none of it was 
found unreliable or untrue and much of 
it was consistent with other sources of reliable 
information. The judge concluded the accused’s 
arrest was lawful. Since the arrest rested on CI 
i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e j u d g e c o n s i d e r e d 
the Debot factors: 
• How compelling was the information?; 
• Was the CI a credible source?; and 
• Was the information sufficiently corroborated 
by police? 
The judge concluded that there was an objective 
basis for the arrest because the information was 
“quite compelling” as it was detailed, recent and 
firsthand; the CI had “proven to be reliable”; and 
the information was corroborated by observations 
of three interactions “consistent with the sale of 
drugs.”
The accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine 
and marihuana for the purpose of trafficking and 
possessing proceeds of crime. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal 
The accused argued the trial 
judge erred in concluding that 
his warrantless arrest, and the 
resulting search of his vehicle, 
did not breach the Charter. In his view, the grounds 
for arrest were not objectively reasonable. Thus, the 
evidence ought to have been excluded and an 
acquittal entered.
Arrest
In upholding the legality of the 
arrest in this case, Justice 
Mainella, delivering the Appeal 
Court’s opinion, stated:
A lawful warrantless arrest pursuant to section 
495(1)(a) of the  Criminal Code  has both a 
subjective and objective component. The 
officer who makes the decision to arrest must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable 
grounds on which to base the arrest and those 
grounds must be objectively justifiable to a 
reasonable person placed in the position of the 
officer. The appropriate standard of proof is one 
of reasonable probability, not proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or a prima facie case. In 
applying that standard, the trial judge must 
assess the totality of the circumstances in a 
practical, non-technical and common-sense 
way, mindful of the knowledge, experience and 
training of the officer. [para. 4]
“The appropriate standard of proof is one of reasonable probability, not proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt or a prima facie case. In applying that standard, the trial judge must 
assess the totality of the circumstances in a practical, non-technical and common-sense 
way, mindful of the knowledge, experience and training of the officer.”
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The Court of Appeal then upheld the trial judge’s 
finding that the arrest was lawful. “Under 
the Debot analysis, a weakness in one area may, to 
some extent, be compensated for by strengths in 
the other two,” said Justice Mainella. “In cases 
such as here, where a tip is compelling and comes 
from a proven reliable informant, corroboration of 
the information is of less concern.” The trial judge 
did not err in determining whether there was an 
objective basis for the arrest in light of the totality 
of the circumstances. He was entitled to rely on the 
CI's information and what it meant in light of the 
extensive drug investigation experience of the lead 
investigator. “In our view, the combination of 
reliable information that the accused would be 
trafficking on the same day he was observed likely 
doing just that is sufficient in law to amount to a 
reasonable belief that objectively  justified the 
arrest,” said Justice Mainella. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
DETENTION INVOLVES 
‘SIGNIFICANT PHYSICAL OR 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESTRAINT’
R. v. Reid, 2019 ONCA 32 
At 6:00 p.m. Toronto Anti-Violence 
Intervention Strategy (TAVIS) officers 
went to a  Toronto Community 
Hous ing Corpora t ion (TCHC) 
townhouse complex. The TCHC was 
concerned about trespassers on its properties and 
the  landlord wrote to the Toronto Police Service 
asking that the  police enforce  Ontario’s Trespass to 
Property Act. The townhouse complex was a large 
property, containing many different buildings, 
housing units, laneways, parking lots, and outdoor 
common areas. 
At about 6:20 p.m., two officers encountered a few 
10-year-old boys in a courtyard area around the 
centre of the complex. As police spoke to the boys, 
the accused (a  36-year-old man) and his 
acquaintance started walking  toward the officers. 
Police spoke to the men.  
The accused was asked a few questions: whether 
he lived at the TCHC property, his name, whether 
he had been in trouble in the past, and his purpose 
for being on the property. The accused provided his 
name and volunteered his date of birth and home 
address. He said that he did not live on the  TCHC 
property, but that he had family in the “area”. He 
also said that he had been arrested a  long time ago 
and that he was at the property to produce music 
and help children to not go down the “same path” 
as he once had. An officer ran a  record check on 
the accused’s name over a  portable radio to 
determine whether he was subject to any court-
imposed conditions forbidding him from being on 
the TCHC property. As the check was being done, 
the accused’s name, date of birth, and address was 
recorded on a 208 card.  The accused’s 
acquaintance was found to be in breach of a 
conditional sentence order and was arrested.
When information was received over the  radio that 
the accused was the subject of a weapons 
prohibition order, the accused “bladed” his body. 
He moved one side of his body away from the 
police. He then tapped a rectangular object on his 
hip and ran. As police ran after him, they saw a 
firearm go flying through the air. The accused was 
tackled when he stopped to retrieve the firearm. He 
was searched incident o arrest and several baggies 
of marijuana were found on him. The firearm was 
loaded with 14 bullets in the magazine and had its 
serial number removed. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
One officer testified that the entire 
encounter between the police and the 
accused, up to the point he ran, was 
five to seven minutes, “give or take a 
minute or two”. The officer also thought he told the 
“[T]he combination of reliable 
information that the accused would be 
trafficking on the same day he was 
observed likely doing just that is sufficient 
in law to amount to a reasonable belief 
that objectively justified the arrest.” 
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accused that he would be  “on his way” once the 
record check was complete. The accused did not 
testify.
The judge found the accused had failed to establish 
on a balance of probabilities that he was detained 
within the meaning of the Charter. The officer’s 
questioning of the  accused did not result from 
singling him out, but from the police speaking to 
both men at the  same time. The police were 
entitled to ask the accused the questions they did 
as part of their legitimate community policing 
exercise and those questions did not create a 
detention. And, even if the accused was detained, 
the judge would have found it justified and not 
arbitrary. 
Finally, even if the accused had been arbitrarily 
detained, the  judge would not have excluded the 
evidence under s. 24(2). First, any violation would 
be a “low level” breach. Second, the impact on the 
accused’s  Charter-protected interests was “very 
limited” and there was a tenuous connection 
between his  Charter  interests and locating the 
f i rearm. Las t ly, there was “the  publ ic ’s 
overwhelming interest in this metropolitan area to 
curtail gun crime and the seeming omnipresence 
of illegal firearms.” The accused was convicted of 
numerous firearm-related offences, possessing 
marihuana and failing to comply with firearm 
prohibition and probation orders. He was 
sentenced to 11.5 years in prison less time served. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, in part, 
that he was arbitrarily detained 
and that the evidence obtained 
by police ought to have been 
excluded under s. 24(2). In his view, he was 
psychologically detained from the moment the 
police first interacted with him. And, if he was not 
detained at that point, he was certainly detained by 
the time the officer made the radio transmission. 
Detention
Justice Fairburn noted “there are  two forms of 
detention: physical and psychological detention.” 
Moreover, “if no detention occurred that ends the 
matter, because if there was no detention, there 
was no arbitrary detention,” said Justice Fairburn. 
“Accordingly, only where there is a detention does 
the court go on to assess whether it  was arbitrary 
in nature.” Here, the accused acknowledged that 
he was not physically detained. Rather, he claimed 
he was psychologically detained. 
There are two types of psychological detention. 
One can arise from a legal requirement that an 
individual comply with a police demand or 
direction, such as a roadside  stop. Another can 
arise where a reasonable person in the 
circumstances in which an accused finds 
themselves would have concluded that they had no 
choice but to stay with the officers and answer the 
questions posed. “In other words,” said Justice 
Fairburn, “whether a reasonable person would 
have concluded that the choice to walk away had 
been removed.”
The accused said that any reasonable person in the 
circumstances of this case would have understood 
that they had no choice but to cooperate with the 
police because of the following:
• He was t he sub j ec t o f a “ f ocu sed 
investigation” in a highly intimidating 
environment. 
• The police dealt with his acquaintance and 
himself separately, effectively taking “control” 
of them. 
• He was a black man confronted by police  in a 
public housing area which would have 
increased his feeling of being  psychologically 
detained. 
• He was effectively told that he could not leave 
until the record check came back and, only 
then, could he be “on his way”.
“If no detention occurred that ends the matter, because if there was no detention, there 
was no arbitrary detention. Accordingly, only where there is a detention does the court 
go on to assess whether it was arbitrary in nature.”
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The Court of Appeal, however, concluded that the 
accused did not satisfy the  onus of demonstrating 
on a  balance of probabilities that he was 
psychologically detained. “The words ‘detained’ in 
s. 9 and ‘detention’ is s. 10 do not reflect the 
simple  act of being slowed down, kept waiting, or 
even stopped by the state,”  said Justice  Fairburn. 
“To the contrary… the words refer to situations 
involving ‘significant physical or psychological 
restraint’.”  She continued:
The need for a detention to involve a significant 
physical or psychological restraint reflects a 
purposive approach to s. 9, one that strikes an 
important balance between ensuring that 
individuals are protected from unjustified state 
interference, while at the same time making 
sure that the societal interest in effective 
policing is not threatened. A failure to consider 
whether the police-citizen interaction involves 
a “significant deprivation of liberty” may result 
in both overshooting the very purpose of 
the  Charter  provision and undervaluing the 
public’s interest in effective policing. The 
purpose of s. 9 is not to make individuals 
inviolate from state contact, but to ensure that, 
where the state actually detains an individual 
(within the legal meaning of that term), the 
detention can be justified upon appropriate 
grounds. [references omitted, para. 26]  
Although the “minority status”  of an individual is a 
relevant consideration in determining  what a 
reasonable person in the individual’s circumstances 
would have concluded, there are other individual 
factors to be taken into account, such as the 
person’s physical stature, age and level of 
sophistication. In this case, the following factors 
militated against a finding of detention:
• The accused was a 36-year-old man of 
sufficient physical stature that it took a number 
of officers to arrest him. 
• The accused interacted clearly and decisively 
with the police. 
• The accused walked toward, not away from, a 
group of police officers who were interacting 
with children. The men walked at a  very slow 
pace and appeared to be trying  to discover 
what was being said between the police and 
children. By walking toward the officers, the 
accused and his friend were not signalling that 
they did not wish to have contact with the 
police. 
• The police did not order the accused to 
approach them or tell him to stay where he 
was. 
• The accused showed no sign of wanting to 
leave in the following few minutes. He  was 
extremely cooperative throughout the police 
interaction with him. He was described as 
being “cool”. 
• The conversation between the police  and the 
accused was pleasant. The accused was 
extremely polite and forthcoming. 
• The accused volunteered information that he 
was not asked for, like his date of birth and 
home address.  
• The accused was never touched by  the police 
or directed by them. 
• The accused never expressed a  desire to leave 
or tried to walk  away (until he ran from 
police). 
• The accused was not surrounded by a group of 
officers in tactical adversarial positions. 
• The accused was not asked incriminating 
questions. He was not instructed to keep his 
hands anywhere nor told to move anywhere. 
“[The accused] was a grown man … and walked 
toward the police voluntarily,” said Justice 
Fairburn. “He was cooperative throughout. He 
answered the questions he was asked and 
volunteered additional information. He showed no 
signs of wanting to leave until the police radio 
transmission was received.” Furthermore, even 
though the officer agreed in cross-examination that 
“The words ‘detained’ in s. 9 and ‘detention’ is s. 10 do not reflect the simple act of being 
slowed down, kept waiting, or even stopped by the state.  To the contrary… the words 
refer to situations involving ‘significant physical or psychological restraint’.” 
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he had “detained” the accused, little weight could 
be placed on this testimony considering the 
officer’s use  of the term “detention”. The officer 
stated, “I was talking to him. If that’s ‘detain’, then, 
yes, then I was”. “Clearly the officer was not using 
the legal definition of detention,”  said the Appeal 
Court. “In any event, whether the circumstances 
were in law a detention was a legal question for 
the court to determine, not for the officer to 
dictate to the court.”  Nor did the fact that the 
officer said that if the accused had tried to leave, he 
would have stopped him from doing so render the 
encounter a  detention. “The fact is … that until the 
[accused] ran from the police, the [accused] did 
not try to leave” said Justice Fairburn. “What might 
have happened had events unfolded differently 
does not inform the legal character of what did 
happen. …  Charter  rights are not breached by 
intention, but action.” 
The Appeal Court also rejected the suggestion that 
a person with a  loaded firearm in his pants would 
not voluntarily  stay to speak with the police. Thus, 
as the argument goes, the accused must have felt 
psychologically detained. In rejecting this 
submission, Justice Fairburn stated:
There are myriad reasons why people speak to 
the police. Some may feel a sense of moral or 
civic duty. Some may just want to interact with 
the police. Some may make a calculated, 
strategic choice to speak with the police, 
thinking that it may work to their benefit. There 
are endless possibilities, too many variables 
and too many unknowns. Whatever the reason, 
the fact that a person might come to regret 
having spoken to the police, does not turn a 
non-detention into a detention.  [reference 
omitted, para. 46]
In the final analysis, the Court of Appeal concluded 
that the accused had not demonstrated that he was 
psychologically detained over the five to seven 
minutes that the police dealt with him.
Lawful Detention?
Although the Court of Appeal concluded there was 
no detention, if there had been one, it was lawful 
as an investigative detention based on reasonable 
grounds to suspect that the accused was trespassing 
on the TCHC property : 
[A] brief investigative detention could have 
been justified given the answers that he gave to 
certain questions. Reasonable grounds to 
suspect is a lower standard than reasonable 
grounds to believe. The former involves a 
standard of possibility and the latter a standard 
of probability. The inquiry into reasonable 
suspicion involves a consideration of all 
objectively apparent facts that the person may 
be involved in the activity under investigation. 
A common sense and practical approach must 
be taken.  
The facts in this case involve the following. 
The [ accused ] was i n a h i gh -c r ime 
neighbourhood that was experiencing problems 
arising from trespassers to the TCHC property. 
The police had been specifically requested to 
enforce the  TPA. The officers had each 
described in their notes how they had seen the 
[two men] loitering. The trial judge found as a 
fact that the “descriptions provided by the 
officers in their evidence seem to fairly fall 
within the ambit of what can reasonably be 
described as loitering.” 
Next, although the [accused] said that he had 
family in the “area”, he did not say that his 
family lived at the TCHC complex. Nor did he 
say he was there to visit his family or with their 
permission. Instead, he gave a wholly different 
reason for being present on the property. That 
reason made reference to helping children and 
there were, in fact, children nearby. Those 
children had been communicating with the 
police and the trial judge found as a fact that 
the [men] had shown “excessive” interest in 
those communications. 
Despite the [accused’s] suggestion that he was 
present on the TCHC property to help children, 
as things unfolded, he was found to be in the 
company of a person who was breaching a 
conditional sentence order and, when searched 
“[W]hether the circumstances were in 
law a detention was a legal question for 
the court to determine, not for the 
officer to dictate to the court.”
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incident to arrest, found to be in possession of 
marijuana. 
In all of those circumstances, there was a 
sufficient constellation of facts to support the 
reasonable possibility that the [accused] was 
trespassing. If there had been a detention for 
the short period of time needed to run the CPIC 
check, in all of those circumstances, I agree 
with the trial judge that it would have been 
justified. [reference omitted, paras. 55-60] 
s. 24(2) Charter
Finally, even if there was a  Charter breach, the 
evidence would nonetheless be admissible. Any s. 
9 Charter breach was “minor and fleeting in 
nature.” The officers acted in good faith and there 
was no evidence to suggest that the police were 
engaged in a systemic misuse of their authority. 
And, contrary  to the accused’s suggestion, the trial 
judge did not place too much emphasis on the 
seriousness of the offence. “The pervasiveness of 
gun violence in Toronto has become ever-present 
and ever-concerning,” said Justice Fairburn. “The 
public has an obvious interest in curtailing that 
form of crime.”  The gun was real and reliable 
evidence and its admission would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
COURT SPLIT ON LEGALITY OF 
DNA PROFILE OBTAINED FROM 
‘ABANDONED’ COFFEE CUP
R. v. D’Amico, 2019 QCCA 77
The accused was suspected of having 
committed sexual assaults on four 
women who were sex workers. The 
police followed the accused to 
collect abandoned DNA but were 
unsuccessful. They then deployed an undercover 
police officer to get his DNA. An undercover police 
officer set up a business meeting with the accused 
who operated a small Internet-related services 
company. During the  first meeting, the officer met 
the accused at his home (where he also worked) on 
the pretext that she was interested in his business. 
She proposed a second meeting. The accused 
agreed and suggested that they meet in a café of his 
choosing.
The officer arrived at the 
café before the accused. 
When he arrived, the 
officer told him that she 
was going to buy herself 
a coffee. The accused 
told her that he wanted a 
coffee as well. They went to the counter, ordered 
their coffees and the accused paid for both. The 
cashier served them their coffee at their table. She 
gave the accused a blue cup and the officer a black 
cup. When the accused finished his coffee, the 
officer said that she  would clear off the table to 
make some room. She got up and carried the cups 
over to the counter. Another undercover officer 
collected the cup the accused had used.
Pol ice considered that the accused had 
“abandoned” his DNA at the café. The cup was 
sent to the laboratory and a  DNA sample was 
obtained. The sample revealed a  possible  match 
with one sex assault case and it was also processed 
through the “crime scene index” of the “Local DNA 
Data Bank”. Further comparisons were made and a 
second match with another case was established. 
Several months later police obtained a  warrant to 
take bodily substances for forensic DNA analysis 
under s. 487.05  of the Criminal Code.  This 
confirmed the previous findings and further 
analysis confirmed a match. The accused was 
subsequently charged with several offences 
including sexual assault and sexual assault causing 
bodily harm. 
Court of Quebec
The accused argued the police illegally, 
through the undercover investigative 
tactic, compelled him to “abandon” his 
DNA. He suggested that the use of his 
DNA analysis to incriminate him breached his ss. 7 
and 8  Charter  rights. In his view, the result of the 
DNA analysis should have been excluded as 
evidence. The judge, however, did not agree. 
Collecting the coffee cup to obtain the accused’s 
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DNA did not violate s. 8, nor did the method used 
to obtain it breach s. 7. The accused abandoned the 
coffee cup with his DNA on it and therefore  did not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. 
There were no tricks on the part of the police and, 
even if he was tricked, it was not a dirty one such 
that the community would be shocked. And there 
was no infringement to the physical integrity of the 
accused. The accused was not in custody and was 
not even offered a coffee by the undercover agent. 
He decided to have one on his own. In addition, he 
was not compelled to discard the cup and he had 
no intention of keeping it. The DNA warrant was 
valid and the evidence  was admissible. There was 
no need to consider s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted.
Quebec Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial judge 
erred in admitting into evidence 
the results of the  analysis of his 
DNA. He contended that his s.  8  Charter  rights 
were violated when the police took a DNA sample 
from the coffee cup. He submitted that he 
maintained an expectation of privacy  in relation to 
his DNA found on it. He also suggested that the 
method used to obtain his DNA sample violated ss. 
7 and 8. Thus, the warrant obtained was invalid and 
his DNA samples should have been excluded from 
evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.
In addition, the accused argued that DNA is 
inevitably left behind by citizens and that it is 
unreasonable to let the state collect it and store it 
forever in databases for possible future use. It was 
his position that the police circumvented the 
legislative regime on collecting and using DNA by 
using a Local DNA Data Bank. The Crown, on the 
other hand, relied exclusively  on abandonment. It 
submitted that the  behaviour of the accused was 
inconsistent with any privacy  interest in the cup, an 
expec t a t i on he cou ld no t have i n t he 
circumstances. In the Crown’s view, the DNA was 
“gathered, not seized”. In any event, the Crown 
argued the evidence was admissible under s. 24(2).
All three appellate  judges agreed the  DNA 
evidence was admissible but for different reasons.   
No Abandonment - A s. 8 Breach
Justice Vauclair found the  police 
obtained the accused’s DNA illegally, 
and therefore his s. 8 Charter rights had 
been violated. He concluded that the 
police are not authorized to actively gather 
“abandoned” DNA from citizens they suspect of 
being involved in criminal activity, and to keep the 
DNA samples indefinitely and use them as they see 
fit:
I have no hesitation in concluding that the 
[accused] had a subjective privacy interest in 
his DNA, that he did not consent to the search 
or seizure, nor did he voluntarily “abandon” his 
DNA, that the police action was a warrantless 
search or seizure, and that the Crown did not 
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness. The 
active police operation to obtain the DNA of 
the [accused] infringed his constitutionally 
protected right. The retention of DNA 
constitutes a continuing infringement. [para. 
167]
Justice Vauclair rejected the position that the 
accused abandoned his DNA and any privacy 
interest he had in it and thus the police were 
allowed to collect it and use it at will. The issue 
was not whether the coffee cup was abandoned but 
whether the accused’s DNA information had been 
abandoned. In only looking at the  coffee cup, the 
trial judge overlooked the true nature of the  thing 
seized. “It is undisputed that when no reasonable 
privacy  interest exists, no protection is afforded 
and, when one truly abandons something, no 
privacy  interest may be claimed,” said Justice 
Vauclair. “True, the  cup was abandoned. I have 
more difficulty finding that the ‘information’ 
present on the coffee cup, the drinker’s DNA, was 
abandoned as well.”
Justice Vauclair found intention must be taken into 
account in determining whether abandonment is 
made out. “A reasonable person does not give any 
thought to whether or not he or she is abandoning 
DNA,” he said. “one simply cannot infer, from the 
being of a person, one’s intention to abandon the 
privacy  interest in one’s DNA information.” Here, 
the police  deliberately afforded itself the 
opportunity to obtain the accused’s DNA for which 
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it would otherwise need an appropriate warrant. 
“DNA samples do not come about through 
‘happenstance’ because  someone is continuously 
under police surveillance,” said Justice Vauclair. 
“There are no fundamental differences between 
constant surveillance of a detainee  and constant 
surveillance of a citizen at liberty. Only the setting 
is different, the control exercised by the police is 
the same.” 
In this case, Justice Vauclair found the police 
engineered the taking of the DNA sample and the 
absence  of any “dirty trick” was not relevant to the 
breach analysis. He did not agree that the concept 
of “abandonment” routinely applied to a  person’s 
DNA given “the nature of DNA itself, its 
substantial informational content and the intrinsic 
high valued privacy expectation it bears.” In his 
opinion, police operations that actively trick 
citizens into giving up their DNA are not 
reasonable and the accused could not be said to 
have abandoned his DNA:
I would conclude that police cannot target a 
person and set that person up in a scenario to 
obtain his or her DNA. Doing so is the 
functional equivalent of collecting someone’s 
DNA while they are in custody and this is not 
possible without a warrant. The practice of 
t r ick ing members o f the publ ic in to 
surrendering a DNA sample should be subject 
to prior authorization by a general warrant 
(487.01 Cr. C.). Once legally seized for its DNA 
potential and analyzed, the use of the DNA 
thereby obtained should be regulated so that 
sufficient safeguards are put into place to strike 
a balance between the competing interests of 
people’s privacy and law enforcement. [para. 
153]
Furthermore, Justice Vauclair was of the view that 
retaining the DNA samples of “suspects” in an 
unregulated data bank for further use or 
comparison also breached s. 8. Despite all of this, 
Justice Vauclair would admit the evidence under s. 
24(2) anyways. 
 
Abandonment - No s. 8 Breach
Justice Thibault disagreed with Justice 
Vauclair. In her view, the accused 
abandoned the cup and therefore had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
DNA found on it. In addressing the concept of 
abandonment, she stated:
Abandonment is an issue of fact. All the 
circumstances must be examined to determine 
whether the person acted in relation to the 
subject matter in such a manner as to lead a 
reasonable observer to conclude that the 
person had waived their privacy interest. Was 
that item discarded permanently or not? Was it 
discarded in a public, semi-public, or private 
place? Was it discarded in a place accessible to 
the general public or to a more-or-less 
restricted group of people? Are there other valid 
reasons leading to the conclusion that the 
privacy interest was or was not waived? etc. 
[para. 310]
Justice Thibault noted there were two approaches in 
determining whether or not a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded 
DNA:
• Approach #1: “The first approach stresses and 
focuses solely on the nature of the subject 
matter collected – bodily  substances – a 
subject matter that is highly personal with 
respect to which a person undoubtedly has a 
direct interest and enjoys a  subjective 
expectation of privacy. Barring cases of 
consent to forensic DNA analysis, or where 
such analysis is authorized by statute or by 
the court, individuals are legally entitled to 
expect that this exclusive, intimate and 
confidential information will not be stolen 
from them. According to this approach, even 
where the subject matter, in this instance the 
cup, was seized in a public place and the 
“I would conclude that police cannot 
target a person and set that person up 
in a scenario to obtain his or her DNA. 
Doing so is the functional equivalent of 
collecting someone’s DNA while they are 
in custody and this is not possible 
without a warrant.”
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police  technique used was not itself intrusive, 
there is nothing to suggest that this person 
explictly or implicitly abandoned his bodily 
substances so that the highly personal 
informational content drawn from the 
forensic DNA analysis of his bodily 
substances could be identified. This person 
simply  discarded the subject matter, in this 
case the cup, which he used to drink his 
coffee in the restaurant that owned it, and 
not his DNA.” [para. 313]
• Approach #2: “The second approach … 
supports the theory that the police may, 
during a police investigation into a person 
suspected of having committed a crime, 
freely collect items abandoned by the suspect 
in a public place to establish a DNA profile 
when the person is not in custody …” This 
approach supports the view that when a 
person voluntarily abandons an item, they also 
abandon any confidential information found 
on it. 
Justice Thibault rejected the first approach because 
the police  would never be  allowed  “to collect an 
item discarded by a person to analyze its bodily 
substances and obtain a DNA profile because it is 
the item that is abandoned, not the DNA of the 
person who used it.”  In this case, “the police had 
sufficient information to justify the existence of 
reasonable grounds to collect the cup. Their 
investigation had revealed that the victims had 
provided a  consistent description of the [accused] 
and a consistent description of the vehicle, that 
three of the victims had provided the same vehicle 
licence plate number, and that the  [accused] had 
been arrested near the scene of one of the 
assaults, in the minutes following that assault, 
while he was at the wheel of the vehicle in which 
the offences were committed.”
Justice Thibault concluded that the trial judge 
correctly decided that the accused had abandoned 
the cup and that his privacy interest had not been 
violated when the  DNA evidence was obtained. 
And, even if there was a Charter  breach, she would 
not have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).
 
No Abandonment - No s. 8 Breach
 
Justice Ruel agreed with Justice Thibault 
that the  police did not breach s. 8 of the 
Charter but added comments concerning 
the accused’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy and his view on abandonment. 
He found that “the theory of abandonment is 
inconsistent with the protection of private 
informational data in a person’s DNA.” In his view, 
“it is simply impossible to imagine that individuals 
implicitly abandon any protection to their genetic 
data  through the natural loss of bodily substances 
in public.” He stated:
I therefore believe, like Vauclair J.A., that, in 
principle, a person does not abandon the 
protection of his or her genetic data for use by 
the state or third parties, even for legitimate 
purposes, without explicit consent. [para. 358]
And further:
In my opinion, individuals do not relinquish 
protection of their DNA data because they have 
disposed of an item that naturally contains 
“The second approach … supports the 
theory that the police may, during a 
police investigation into a person 
suspected of having committed a crime, 
freely collect items abandoned by the 
suspect in a public place to establish a 
DNA profile when the person is not in 
custody …”
“[T]he theory of abandonment is 
inconsistent with the protection of 
private informational data in a person’s 
DNA. ... [I]t is simply impossible to 
imagine that individuals implicitly 
abandon any protection to their genetic 
data through the natural loss of bodily 
substances in public.” 
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DNA, such as a tissue or chewing gum or by 
spitting on the ground, or by leaving traces of 
DNA through natural biological processes such 
as hair loss or the elimination of human waste. 
[para. 363]
Justice Ruel then reframed the question from 
whether the accused abandoned his DNA to 
whether he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
related to the forensic  identification analysis of the 
DNA he left on the cup. He described it this way:
[T]the public should widely be aware that 
individuals can be identified by comparing 
their DNA profile with DNA found on crime 
scenes.
The technique itself is not intrusive from an 
informational perspective, as it is not intended 
to search a person’s DNA data to extract highly 
personal information. Its purpose is much 
narrower and seeks to identify specific 
sequences of a person’s DNA chain, so that a 
person’s profile can be distinguished from other 
profiles with a very high probability.
CODIS uses the STR analysis (“Short Tandem 
Repeats”), which are short DNA sequences of 
about 2 to 5 repeating “letters”. These 
repetitions are specific to each individual and 
determine whether two DNA samples come 
from the same person. This comparison means 
examining the STR located at 13 positions 
along the chromosomes (called loci). 
After an STR analysis, an individual’s DNA 
profile resembles a bar code forming a specific 
pattern of lines of varying length. Each DNA 
profile is unique and can be distinguished from 
every other profile in the various DNA data 
banks, in the same way that a bar code 
distinguishes a product among all the items 
sold in a grocery store. 
This analysis has a specific, limited purpose 
and does not reveal any medical, physical or 
mental characteristics of the person. ….
In this case, it is true that the [accused] did not 
waive the general protection of his DNA data. 
However, he knew or should have known that 
leaving bodily substances in public could 
eventually allow law enforcement to collect 
and analyze his DNA for comparative 
purposes.
Moreover, the DNA identification technique is 
not used to extract highly personal information, 
but to identify markers for comparison.
As previously stated, the manner in which the 
bodily substances were obtained is important, 
and the police simply gave the [accused] the 
opportunity to leave a cup containing his saliva 
in public. This method is not on its own abusive 
or unreasonable. 
In conclusion on this point, I find that the 
police did not breach the [accused’s] 
fundamental right when they conducted a 
limited and reasonable non-intrusive operation 
to obtain a sample, in a public place, for the 
sole purpose of comparing one DNA sample 
with another. [reference omitted, paras. 
374-382]
Since the  accused could not claim an expectation 
of privacy in relation to the analysis of the  DNA 
found on the cup, the search of the  local DNA data 
bank did not breach his rights. Justice Ruel found 
no breach of  s. 8  in this case. Therefore, the 
evidence was admissible. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: The accused in this case was also a 
suspect in a murder investigation but was ruled out 
as a suspect as a result of a forensic DNA analysis.
“In my opinion, individuals do not 
relinquish protection of their DNA data 
because they have disposed of an item 
that naturally contains DNA, such as a 
tissue or chewing gum or by spitting on 
the ground, or by leaving traces of DNA 
through natural biological processes 
such as hair loss or the elimination of 
human waste.”
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USB SEARCH NOT RELATED TO 
REASON FOR ARREST: 
CHARTER BREACH PROVEN
R. v. Balendra, 2019 ONCA 68
Two police officers saw what they 
believed to be a stolen red Dodge 
Caravan based on a police database 
search. The vehicle swerved across 
the highway onto an exit ramp, an 
evasive manoeuvre police believed was made to 
avoid a pursuit. The police vehicle was positioned 
in front of the van and brought it to a stop on the 
shoulder of the exit ramp. A second police vehicle 
arrived and blocked in the van. The accused (driver) 
was arrested for possession of stolen property and 
careless driving. The passenger was also arrested for 
possession of stolen property. The passenger’s 
wallet was searched at the roadside and an Ontario 
driver's licence in someone else’s name but bearing 
a photograph of the passenger, as well as other ID 
was found. Police became suspicious about the 
driver's licence. Both men were taken into custody 
and the van  was removed by a towing company 
and secured in a compound.
At the police station both men’s identities were 
confirmed and it was learned the accused had a 
suspended driver’s licence. A passport-sized 
photograph of the passenger had also been found 
in the accused’s possession. This photograph was 
an identical likeness to that on the driver's licence 
found in the passenger’s possession. The accused 
was also found in possession of a USB key (drive). 
The USB key was searched, about seven hours after 
the accused’s arrest. Its contents were  examined for 
10-30 minutes. It was found to contain, among 
other things, multiple credit card numbers and 
what was believed to be a driver's licence template. 
Based on the information obtained through 
the  search  of the  USB  key, the following day the 
o f f i c e r d e c i d e d t o c o n d u c t a m o r e 
thorough search of the van. The officer attended the 
impound lot where the  van  was being held and 
searched it without a warrant. He noticed a loose 
ceiling compartment, from which he extracted a 
concealed plastic bag containing a number of 
credit cards. The officer took the bag, along with 
some other items found in the vehicle, back to the 
police station.  
Five days later the officer again accessed 
the  USB  key in order to look at the information 
contained on it, and printed off numerous pages 
containing approximately 2,500 credit card 
numbers, the Ontario driver's licence believed to 
have been used as a template and a photograph of 
an unidentified male. After printing the contents of 
the  USB  key, the officer decided to apply for 
a warrant to carry out a more probing search of it. 
The resulting search of the USB key by the e-crimes 
unit did not reveal any additional information 
beyond that which the officer had already obtained. 
Based on the information obtained through 
the  searches, the accused was charged with eight 
fraud-related offences. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The officer testified that he searched the 
USB key as an incident to the accused’s 
arrest. He said he believed the USB key 
could hold valuable information to assist 
in facilitating the creation of the driver's licence 
found on the passenger. Although the officer 
confirmed that the accused had been arrested only 
in relation to the stolen vehicle and careless 
driving, he did not  search  the USB key in relation 
to either of those offences, nor was there any 
indication that he might expect to find any 
information related to those offences. Rather, he 
said he was engaged in investigating a  separate 
impersonation offence in relation to the accused 
and his passenger. 
As for the van, the officer said he did not seek a 
search warrant because he understood that the 
vehicle was stolen and that the accused would not 
have had an expectation of privacy in a  stolen 
vehicle. He also acknowledged that he wanted to 
perform the  search of the van,  in part, because of 
what he had found on the  USB  key, and that his 
intent was to further the personation investigation. 
As for the second warrantless search of the USB 
key, the officer felt that he was already in lawful 
possession of the information, having seen it on a 
prior occasion incident to the accused’s arrest.
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The accused sought the exclusion of the evidence 
on the basis that his s. 8 Charter rights had been 
infringed during the first search of the USB key, the 
search of the impounded van and second search of 
the  USB  key. The judge, however, disagreed. 
Although the judge found that a  USB  drive was 
quite  capable  of holding and revealing extensive 
personal information about a person in the same 
way as a computer, she held that the first search of 
the USB key was valid as an incident to arrest. The 
search of the van did not breach s. 8 because the 
accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in  it, and therefore no standing to advance a s. 8 
claim. Finally, the second  search  of the  USB  key 
was not a new  search, but rather an extension of 
the  search conducted earlier as an incident to 
arrest, which was also reasonable. The evidence 
obtained through the  searches was admissible and 
the accused was convicted of four fraud-related 
offences. He was sentenced to four years' 
imprisonment.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among 
other things, that the trial 
judge erred in relation to her 
analysis of each search. In his 
view, the evidence should have been excluded 
under s. 24(2) and an acquittal should have been 
entered. 
The First USB search 
The Court of Appeal found, as the  trial judge did, 
that the accused did have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the contents of the USB key found in 
his pocket, although it did not find it necessary to 
define the level or intensity of that interest relative 
to other such devices with any further precision. As 
for whether the search fell within the scope of a 
valid search incident to arrest, the Court of Appeal 
found it did not. The search was not truly incidental 
to the  offence for which the accused had been 
arrested (possessing stolen property and careless 
driving). 
Here, [the officer] candidly acknowledged in 
his evidence on the voir dire  that he looked at 
the  USB  key because he thought that it could 
have evidence relating to the developing 
impersonation investigation, and not because 
he expected to find any evidence in relation to 
the careless driving or possession of stolen 
property charges that had been laid. The 
[accused] had not been charged with anything 
relating to credit card fraud or impersonation at 
that point.
The test for determining whether a  search  is 
incidental to arrest has both a subjective and an 
objective component. While [the officer] 
subjectively believed his look at the  USB  key 
was incident to the [accused’s] arrest, this belief 
was not objectively reasonable because the 
officer was not looking for information relating 
to the stolen  van  charge but rather to the 
investigation that was superseding it with 
respect to which no charges had yet been laid. 
Put another way, he was not (subjectively) 
aware that the initial arrest did not (objectively) 
authorize him to look at the USB key in order 
to find evidence of impersonation or fraud. 
[paras. 45-46]
Furthermore, in applying the scope of a  search 
incident to arrest doctrine  as it applies to 
“The test for determining whether a search is incidental to arrest has both a subjective 
and an objective component. While [the officer] subjectively believed his look at 
the USB key was incident to the [accused’s] arrest, this belief was not objectively 
reasonable because the officer was not looking for information relating to the 
stolen van charge but rather to the investigation that was superseding it with respect to 
which no charges had yet been laid. Put another way, he was not (subjectively) aware 
that the initial arrest did not (objectively) authorize him to look at the USB key in order 
to find evidence of impersonation or fraud.”
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cellphones, “there was no evidence that the 
investigation would be ‘stymied or significantly 
hampered absent the abi l i ty to  search’ 
the USB key  incident  to arrest.” Rather, both men 
had been arrested and were in police custody. 
The USB key and the van had also been seized and 
secured, and there was no risk of the  USB  key 
being accessed or otherwise tampered with 
remotely. “In short, I find that the first  search  of 
the  USB  key was not objectively reasonable 
because it was not conducted to find evidence of 
the particular offences for which the  [accused] had 
been arrested,” said Justice Harvison Young. “Had 
it been related to those offences, the search would 
still not be  justified because the investigation 
would not have been stymied or significantly 
hampered absent the search incident to arrest.”
The Search of the van 
The accused’s argument that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the  van  because he had 
“care and control” of the van by virtue of driving it 
was rejected. The  van  had been registered as a 
stolen vehicle and the accused offered no 
contradictory evidence regarding his ownership of 
the van, or regarding any authorization given by the 
registered owner to operate the  vehicle. There was 
no evidence to establish that the accused had any 
ability to regulate access to the  van  or any 
legitimate privacy  interest with respect to it. As a 
result, s. 8 was not engaged by the van search. The 
credit cards found inside it were thus admissible. 
The Second USB key search 
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in 
treating the second USB key search as a 
c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e f i r s t o n e . “ T h e 
two  searches  were factually and temporally 
distinct,” said Justice Harvison Young. “As with the 
first search of the USB key, this second search was 
not reasonable as it was not truly incidental to the 
[accused’s] arrest  for possession of stolen 
property.”  Nor was there any exigency. 
The  USB  key had been seized and its contents 
could not have been remotely affected. In addition, 
there  were ample grounds to obtain a search 
warrant based on what had been lawfully found on 
the accused and his passenger, and from the van. 
s. 24(2) Charter
Despite the unreasonable searches of the USB key, 
the evidence found on it was nevertheless admitted 
under s. 24(2). Although the USB search constituted 
a serious breach of the accused’s s. 8 rights, the 
actual impact of the breach on him was minimal, 
given both the content of the information found on 
the  USB  key and the  fact that a warrant was 
ultimately obtained which authorized its  search. 
Moreover, the evidence was reliable and central to 
the Crown's case. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Incident To Arrest
In Balendra, Justice Harvison Young 
cited R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 in setting 
out “four conditions with which a 
search of a cellphone incident to arrest 
should comply in order to be lawful: 
1. The arrest itself must be lawful;
2. The search must be "truly" incidental to arrest, and 
have a valid law enforcement purpose in 
(a) protecting the police, the accused or the public;
(b) preserving evidence; or 
(c) discovering evidence, including locating 
additional suspects, in situations in which the 
investigation will be stymied or significantly 
hampered absent the ability to promptly search 
the cell phone incident to arrest;
3. The nature and extent of the search must be tailored 
to the purpose of the search; and
4. The police must take detailed notes of what they have 
examined on the device and how it was searched.”




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      

      




        
       



    

www.10-8.ca
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March 22, 2019 
Online replay                                       Click here.
March 4, 2019    Optional Workshop: March 5, 2019
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
April 26, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
March 22, 2019   
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
April 25, 2019 
In person or Webcast                            Click here.
Volume 16 Issue 5 - September/October 2016
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
15-006
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF EMERGENCY & SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2019 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2019.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
April 10-May 8, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
April 24-May 29, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
March 6-20, 2019
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002) 
March 11, 2019
Tactical Communications (INVE-1012) 
March 12-15, 2019
Application for and Execution of Search Warrants 
(INVE-1006) 
March 18, 2019
Testifying in Legal Proceedings/Hearings (INVE-1008)
 
March 25, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills & Processes 
(INVE-1003) 
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
February 11-15, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes 
(INVE-1003)
April 29-30, 2019
Introduction to the Criminal Justice System 
(INVE-1000)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
